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STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION. (Third Series). By Randolph E. Paul.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, i94o. Pp. xvii, 539. Price:
$6.OO.
Mr. Paul has become one of the most effective as well as one of the
most prolific writers upon the law of the federal income tax. He combines
an accurate knowledge of the day by day problems of taxation gained from
an active New York City law practice with an inquiring academic interest in
the possibilities of the better development of the income tax statute. His
Law of Federal Income Taxation, prepared with his former law partner,
Jacob Mertens, Esq., was an encyclopedic history and interpretation in six
volumes of all the modern statutory provisions, decisions and regulations.
With its publication in 1934, Mr. Paul evidently realized that, like Sisyphus,
he could never hope to conquer his chosen task. There would always be
more new decisions and more new statutes than he could keep abreast of
in any single volume or group of volumes on the field as a whole. He
could hope, however, to advance the science by monographs on particular
subjects within the general field. These he has been regularly giving us
since 1937.
The current volume consists of five essays, all on aspects of the federal
income tax: Reorganizations (165 pp.); Revocable Trusts (including
trusts for the grantor's benefit) (30 pp.); Mortgagors -and Mortgagees
(55 PP.); Life Insurance and Annuities (69 pp.); and Use and Abuse of
Tax Regulations in Statutory Construction (49 pp.). Three of them have
appeared in part in the Harvard and Yale Law Reviews. It goes almost
without saying that each essay is very fully annotated, and is an exhaustive
treatment, historical and analytical, of the particular topic. All represent
the best legal writing, lucid, gracefully expressed, almost too much decorated at times with quotations from writers whose eyes were fixed on
horizons well beyond the confines of the income tax." Of course the essays
are not of even value. The opening study of reorganizations is at once the
longest and the most carefully done. The historical development of the
trust provisions is not as completely presented, nor are the current problems as adequately outlined. Although the gift and estate tax provisions
are mentioned, they are given only two and a- half pages of text.2 Since
problems under the three taxing acts commonly arise together, the reader
wishes unhappily for an equally competent treatment of these two deliberately omitted transfer taxes as applied to the trusts being considered. The
Clifford case 8 is frequently mentioned, but its implications in other situations are not fully explored, probably only because of the fact that the
decision shortly antedated the publication of these studies. The chapter on
mortgagors and mortgagees left me somewhat unsatisfied. For one thing,
that *landmark on this topic, the Midland Mutual decision, one of Mr. Justice Brandeis' several unsuccessful opinions in the accounting field, is not
as thoughtfully dissected as one would wish. These comparatively few
adverse observations, however, must not obscure the fact that the book is
i. Thus on p. go, Austin, Holmes, Cardozo, Frank, and Bishop Hoadley are
cited or quoted; the Bishop appears again on p. 176 in the company of Gray, Laski,
Mai shall, Morris Cohen and T. R. Powell. Most striking are pp. 208-9, where 24
lines of text consist mainly of quotations, with citations of Holmes, Bogoslovsky, Liewellyn, Frank, Radin, Robinson, T. R. Po-,ell, Dickinson, Dewey, Pound, Williston,
Wu, Cardozo, Tugwell, Wigmore, and Carlyle, among others.
2. Pp. i8r-3.
3. Itelvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (94o).
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generally a masterful job of assembly, correlation and analysis of a great
mass of technical and difficult material.
That a sizeable book should be devoted to only five segments of only
one highly specialized field of law affords considerable food for thought.
Some 12oo decisions are cited, some of them many times, and some of them
are exhaustively considered. Thus the materials available for discussion
bulked large; a book of this size and character could not deal adequately
with more topics, or more comprehensively with the chosen few. Extended
as is the discussion of reorganizations, it does not give much help to the
tax specialist who must plan one, and who certainly hopes to devise a
scheme, more or less original, which falls outside the amibit of the decisions,
elaborately considered, in which immediate tax liability has been imposed.
Nor does the book as a whole assist very much in providing a general
understanding of federal income taxation for the lawyer in general practice. For him it is too specialized; for the specialist, it is perhaps not specialized enough. Of course, the whole round world (or better, perhaps,
chaosy of federal taxes other than the income tax finds no place here; nor
does state ta.xation, whether of income or of other sources. Iii this fastmoving world, whose complexities are so little understood by the laity, one
wonders about the adequacy of these lengthy law review articles, stirring
up the minutia in a particular narrow field, understood well enough by six
men, whose information, however, is not much enlarged nor their techniques
much improved; understood very little by lawyers outside this little group.
We need two classes of legal writing, for one of which we are pretty
badly starved. The flood of decisions being so great, there must necessarily
be careful monographs like these on single topics. At the least, they provide invaluable guide-posts to all workers in the field; at best, they provide
much light and leading. On the whole, university law review articles, of
which these Studies are prime examples, serve this purpose well; best perhaps when, like the Duke and the Iowa Reviews, the editors seek to offer in
a single issue an integrated consideration of the major problems in one
field of law. In the second place, we badly need more lucid discussion of
the major issues in whole broad fields of law, and of great movements in
the law. To be useful, such articles must be written by men who have so
mastered all the detailed materials that they can rise above the marshalling
of case digests along a chosen string of thought; that they can relate and
discuss accurately the broad implications for the future of the tremendous
mass of decisions on innumerable single points which has gone before.
Studies like these may be classic contributions if their authors can also
bring to bear upon legal materials the modes of thought and analysis of
other social sciences more closely related to law than our universities' divisions into departments and professional schools have allowed us to know.
Cardozo and Pound have done some of this as to law as a whole; but very
little of the sort has been done for the various individual fields of law. Our
texts are pedestrian. The author does not share his experiences as a
philosopher with the reader.
Some day Mr. Paul may well write such a book in TaxatiQn. He has
assembled much of the equipment, in his painstaking digests of all available
material; in his obvious awareness of the social implications of his legal
data. In the meantime, we can be duly grateful for these admirably documented Studies, an excellent accomplishment in making straight a few of
the many crooked paths in this most important modern maze.
Roswell Magill.t
t Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law.
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LEGAL REALISM AND JUSTICE.

By Edwin N. Garlan.

Columbia Uni-

versity Press, New York, i94i. Pp. xiii, I6I. Price: $2.00.
What is the true purpo'se and objective of this book? Is it a partisan
defense of legal realism, or is it an attempt to appraise impartially the most
active American legal philosophy 'of our times? The answers to these
queries must inevitably affect the attitude and approach of a reviewer.
Certain it is that the publisher's blurb is a bit too optimistic when it
states that Dr. Garlan "has made order out of confusion of individual
voices" of realism.' Such a statement must be questioned at a time when
realists themselves admit that realism "is twenty things in one" 2 and competent critics contend that it is going in twenty directions at once! There
are limits to the mental gymnastics even of legal philosphers; order and
realism are not yet nodding acquaintances.
One may also object to the conclusion of Professor Patterson that Dr.
Garlan's appraisal of realism was written with "detachment" a (unless he
means by detachment a complete scholastic isolation from all critics of
realism). It is in order to note the fact that Garlan's helpmates were all
realists of the Columbia School who gave him "personal advice and encour-"
agement" and were ever ready to assist with "kindly criticisms and
suggestions". 4
Now the preliminary appraisal of Garlan's treatise on realism is not
made by way of criticism but rather of understanding the -approach which
he used in writing his very scholarly little book. Certainly no realist can
object to the consideration .of the possible effects of external stimuli and
academic environment upon an author's viewpoint. Despite the group of
realist "godfathers", to borrow a term made famous by Professor Rodell
in his valiant defense of "law 'n order"," Garlan has disclosed rare intellectual independence. He has pointed out many of the weaknesses of realism, some of which are concededly temporary excrescences due to the
1: If a "rewrite" of the publisher's announcement is to be undertaken, I suggest
that the following statement should also be whittled down: ". . . at the very heart
of which [realism]. are to be found the ideas and practices of such men as Holmes,
Cardozo and Pound." Of course, Dean Pound will plead "misjoinder" and may even
point to the fact that Garlan himself has listed Pound among the vigorous critics of,

realism (p. ir). It should be recalled that Cardozo refused to accept undiluted realism
even in the callow days when realists were creeping about the juristic nursery and
long before the front-runners of realism came forth. Cardozo, Address (1932) 55
REPORT oF N. Y. STATE BAR ASS'N 264.
But more astounding, the usual top-billing of Justice Holmes as the father of
realism may now require reconsideration. Recent disclosures in the intimate HoLmzsPOLLOcK LETRaS (1941) reveal the innermost jurisprudential thoughts of the venerable
jurist. "I hate facts," confided Holmes to Pollock, his friend "who counted most in
his life." 2 HOL.ES-PoLLOCK Lirnms (1941) 13, 43. (Italics added.) One must
really love facts to be a real realist. Kennedy. Principles or Facts? (1935) 4 .FoanIIASt L. REV. 53; cf. Frank, Book Review (194) 54 HARv. L. REv. 9o5. Today tr-o
of the weak spots of realism are its wide acceptance of pragmatic philosophy and its
willingness to go "all-out" for modern psychology. Kennedy. Pragmatismas a Philosophy of Law (1924) 9 MARQ. L. REP. 63; Psychologism in the Law (940) 29 Gso.L
J. ,39. It is not without significance that back of the scenes Holmes labelled "pragmatism an amusing humbug" as far back as x9o8 [z HOL.tFS-PoLLOCK LErrTs (igsi)
139] and found scant "nourishment" in Freudian complexes fid. at 229]. It begins to
look as though we might be obliged to rate Holmes as a realist only "interstitially".
2. Llewellyn, Some Rcalism About Realism (1931) 44 HARV.L. REV. 1222, 1223.
3. Foreword, viii.
4. Preface, xii.
Lest the reviewer be charged with failure to reveal his own bias, suffice it to say
that Garlan records that "Kennedy has been the most persistent critic of legal realism
(p. z2, n.).
5. WoF UxTo You, LAWYERS (1939) x.
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spread-eagle tendencies of a new philosophy on the wing.6 While he-discloses a wide reading and reasonable mastery of the materials of realism,'
he fails to note that some of the defects of realism which he attributes to
the personal enthusiasms and literary effervescence of particular realists
are not superficial, but inherent in the substance of the new philosophy.'
Another defect in the appraisal of realism by Dr. Garlan is his effort
to throw off certain parts of realism which have proved to be impediments
and burdens in recent years. Compare, for example, the estimate of
Fuller 9 regarding the lack of separation of the is from the ought in legal
realism with Garlan's assumption that "what is cannot be separated from
what is wanted .. . ." 11 Garlan refers to the striking phrase of Uewellyn
that the law is a "repair shop". So it is, provided that we keep in mind
that human beings do not expect to live their lives in hospitals, under microscopes or on the operating table. Nor does human frailty require it. The
anti-realist argues that the presence of an eclipse of the sun is an event of
scientific importance but it should not obscure the fact that it is a rare,
infrequent occurrence. So also the normal activities of life and of law
should emphasize health and happiness rather than the abnormal and
unusual facts which are so frequently stressed in realist research and
investigation.
When Gatlan shakes off the impediments of realism, as he does in the
latter part of his book, and becomes a jurisprudential courier without lug6. Garlan points out that realists have "overreached" in argumentation directed
against conceptual thinking. (I wonder if Garlan is thinking of the gastronomical
approach-the so-called "wheatie-explanation" of judicial decisions.) He also concedes that certain attitudes and analyses of realism 'are misleading if not erroneous"
(pp. 11-12).
7. I agree with Patterson that Garlan's bibliography is the best available. (Foreword, viii.) But I am at a loss to understand why Garlan omits RoDELL, WOE UNTo
You, LAWvYSs (1939) and CHASE, TYRANNY OF WORDS (I938).

For some reason or

other, realists have failed to recognize that Professor Rodell's position, while extreme,
is a logical but ruthless adaptation of legal realism. I disagree with the contention of
Professor Llewellyn that Professor Rodell was merely attempting, unsuccessfully, to
perpetrate a bit of humor upon his readers. Llewellyn, On Reading and Using the
New Jurispnrdence (1940) 26 A. B. A. J. 418, 425. Professor Rodell's thesis is very
seriously developed. The humor, if any, in this treatment must be objectively supplied.
8. For example, Garlan's dismissal of Arnold's incisive caricatures" (pp. 15-i7)
as inconsequential incidents of Arnold's legal philosophy is not in accord with the estimate of Arnold's friendly critic Max Lerner. Lerner, The Shadow World of Thurman Anrold (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 687, 700. The valiant effort of the author to associate Arnold's opportunism with "fundamental principles" is not particularly persuasive
(pp. 111-113).

Garlan also excuses the personal failings of Jerome Frank in offering his "psychoanalytic interpretations" of legal certainty as though it were'a mere passing fancy of no
considerable consequence (p. 12). The anti-realist, however, observes that realism
seems to be just one fad after another. The dismissal of psychoanalysis was followed
by the wide acceptance of behaviorism which in turn was displaced by the current overemphasis and distortion of semantic reform-each successive ism having a movement
of its own, and all containing one common element: that law is in fact the individualized output of a judge without benefit of stable standards, ideals or concepts.
A current example of the flexibility of realism in action is observable by the comparison of two articles by Professor Walton H. Hamilton, Sotuthmayd Professor of
Law, Yale Law School. Cf. Hamilton, Trial by Ordeal, New Style (1941) 50 YALE
L. J. 778, and Hamilton, The Liz4ng Law (937)
26 GRAPHIC SURVEY 632. In the
former article, Hamilton is seriously disturbed by the failure of the New York courts
to implement the recent Bertrand Russell case with pertinent "principles" and "landmarks" of authority. However, in The Living Law, Hamilton glorifies the philosophy
of joyful jurisprudence which permits a court to modify existing law without too much
concern about current precedents.
9. See FULLER, LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (194o) 60.
1O.

P. 29. Cf. 'McDougal, Fuller v.The Amenwan Legal Realists: An Interzen-

hIon (1941)

50 YALE L J. 827.
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gage, he seems to be more sure-footed. His analysis of the factors which
go to make up the general concept of "justice" is one which arouses the
interest and approval of a conceptualist. True it is that, even in this part
of his treatment, he occasionally attempts to defend realism with results
that are not wholly convincing 11
Classifying this book as a primer of realism, approved by leaders in
the movement, Garlan has presented a personal gloss which nullifies some
of the shortcomings of realism and deserves the consideration not alone of
the critics, but particularly of adherents to the realist philosophy.
Walter B. Kcnnedy.t
PENNSYLVANIA ANNOTATIONS

TO THE RESTATEUENT OF THE LAW Ov

RESTITUTION. Prepared by D. J. Farage. American Law Institute
Publishers, St. Paul, i94o. Pp. iv, 369. Price: $;.oc.*
Annotating a Restatement of Restitution with Pennsylvania decisions
is a task of peculiar difficulty. The problems of unjust enrichment and
their solution pervade the published reports from I Dallas down to Atlantic
Second. But the materials are not readily accessible by use of the usual
means of digests, cyclopedias, text books, head-notes and indices. The
topics of restitution, in its present scope, and its predecessor, quasi-contract,
are quite modern.1 Aside from a few recent casebooks and rather short
treatises one cannot find in one place even an approach to an inclusive collection of authorities. The only practicable method of assembling the Pennsylvania cases has been a complete reading of the reports volume by volume,
page by page, and even line by line, for frequently even the judges who
wrote the opinions did not realize that they were dealing with problems
which would fall into the category of the lav of restitution. Not only must
the annotator spot the pertinent cases, but, in order to assign the cases to
the proper sections, he must be familiar with the whole content of the
Restatement, which follows no time honored pattern.
How well the work has been done cannot be determined by a superficial glance. It is necessary to check the result by independent research.
This reviewer, who is attempting to collect the Pennsylvania cases on security, has found that as to a few topics 'with which he is familiar, such as
indemnity and subrogation, the Annotations to Restitution 'include substantially all the materials which have been found by the use of other aids to
research and a great many more. The writer or briefmaker in any field of
the law who has to deal with a problem of restitution will find these annotations an invaluable aid in his investigations of Pennsylvania law.
When it comes to minor details, the annotator has been handicapped
by the fact that he is not a specialist in every field of the law in which restitmution problems arise. The annotator has not taught the entire law school
curriculum, which would be the ideal qualification for the task. A teacher
of partnership would not refer to a corporation as a "firm". 2 A teacher of
mortgages would not include under a paragraph entitled "Where vendee of
land assumes mortgage or lien" 3 cases of mortgage assumption mingled
indiscriminately with those in which a grant is "under and subject to" an
encumbrance, a transaction with somewhat different legal incidents. One
I. See, for example, his rather surprising contention that there is much in com-

mon between the natural-law philosophy and contemporary realism (p. x2o).
t Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.

* This is for the bound edition. The pocket part may be obtained for $2.50.
i. See Lord Wright's review of the Restatement in (1937) 5i HARV. L. R~r. 39
2. Pp. 206, 2o&
3. P.- 9
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more familiar with the law of corporations would have noted under Section
148 the novel and significant points of one of the cases, cited elsewhere,
Bailey v. Jacobs,4 viz., the applicability of the statute of limitations to the
remedy against the unfaithful corporate officer, and the imputing to shareholders of knowledge of matters which could be seen from the examination
of corporate records, whether or not they have exercised their right to
examination. However, since the passing of Blackstone, Kent and Story,
it is unreasonable to attempt to apply to any one humnan being the fiction
of legal omniscience.
As has been noted restitution is a broad subject and the annotations
include materials of use to the practitioner and student in every branch of
the law. How to find what is contained in these annotations is a serious
problem. The most obvious approach for one interested in a specific point
is to consult the index of the Restatement of Restitution, read the entire
text of the sections which appear to be pertinent, then go to the annotations.
The latter are tied up closely with the black letter sections and subsections,
the comments and the illustrations, with cross references to other sections
of this Restateinent and to the other Restatements which have been published and annotated or are being annotated. It would be very helpful if
there were an index of cases appended to the annotations, and this seems
more desirable here than in the case of any of the other Restatement Annotations because of the generally unfamiliar character of the subject as organized and the comprehensiveness of the annotator's treatment. As it is, only
by a thorough study of the Restatement can the practitioner and student
realize the scope and usefulness of the annotations.
Judson A. Crane.t
CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY SECURITY. By George E. Osborne.
West Publishing Co., St. Paul, 194o. Pp. lxiv, 1o39. Price: $6.oo.
CASES AND MATERIALS ON SECURITY. (Second Edition). By John Hanna.

The Foundation Press, Inc., Chicago, 1940.

Pp. xxvi, 1I1 7 .

Price:

$6.50.
Professor Hanna's casebook, as a second edition, raises the primary
question of how does it differ from the first edition." In the new volume
sixteen leading cases have been added; ten digest cases have been added
(four of which were formerly leading cases) ; ten leading cases and I7O
digest cases have been omitted entirely.
An introductory section has been added on personal property as security, treating, in a general fashion, possessory liens, pledges and contemporary law review material on security problems. A section has been added
dealing with the creditor's interest in the surety's security. Also, the problem of the failure to record mortgage instruments has been made into a
section. An introductory section (mortgage moratoria) prior to foreclosure has been added. No sections have been omitted, but the section originally treating the priority of the conditional vendor has now been merged
with fixture problems.
The additions and omissions represent, in the main, changes in the
law rather than new cases for the same material. In fact, the complete
story of the changes constitutes a history of the law of security from 1932
to 194o. For example, the old standby of Richardson v. Shaw,2 spread
4. 325 Pa. 187 (1936).
t Professor of Law and Secretary, University of Pittsburgh Law School.
I. First edition 1932.
2. 209 U. S. 365 (igo8).
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over ten pages in the first edition, is now reduced to a six line note. This
is the result of Section 6oe (5) of the Chandler Act.3
Professor Osborne's book is a newcomer to the security field, but will
probably be a welcome addition. Real property as security is separated
from personal property as security. With this exception an orthodox
organization is used. There is no attempt to use factual appellations such
as mark Hanna's book. For example, in the latter can be found such subtitles as "Direct Short Term Loans Secured by Shares, Bonds, Negotiable
Instruments, Documents of Title, and Accounts Receivable" or "Importing
Transactions". Professor Osborne uses down to earth common law terminology with little yielding to the modern school of thought that the business
form is more important than the legal phraseology. In fairness, however,
it should be noted that he "firmly believes in attempting to discover and
evaluate the 'nonlegal' factors .
. the part played by conflicting economic interests and theories, current or moribund philosophical ideals,
competing views of social desirability, business expediency . . .
etc.
However, he "also believes that there has been a considerable overemphasis
of the value . . . -in achieving this end, of unorthodox and novel arrangements of materials, the employment of vivid and arresting phrases, and the
studied use of the vocabulary of the layman (albeit not that of a very ordinary one, and certainly not that of a business man) rather than the generally accepted and understood language and categories of the courts and
lawyers." 5 If this were not a professor expounding legal philosophy, it
might be taken as a "crack" at Hanna's casebook.
In a comparison of the two books instructors will have to consider the
fact that Professor Hanna's includes some two hundred pages on "The
Third Person as Security". If a combination course of suretyship and.
mortgages is desired, this book is admirably suited to the purpose. If this
is not an element in the choice, it is somewhat of a toss up between the two
books. Both are scholarly, complete and very well annotated. As a student,
the reviewer waded through Professor Hanna's book and, after reading and
working with it, the conclusion is that he would prefer (if he had to do
it over again) to take a course in mortgages using Professor Osborne's
book. Professor Hanna's detailed outlined analysis would be very helpful
if it were not for the fact that all too often the cases have little to do with
the subheading under which they appear. For example, section two of the
chapter on priorities is entitled "Requirements of Public Recordation" and
subdivision "(c)" under that is "After-acquired property". The first case
under the section is one of the Guaranty Trust cases 7 and it has nothing to
do with recordation although that is the running title that appears above it.
A student will try to brief the point relating to recording and draw a blank.
It is this type of thing that makes Professor Hanna's book a student's nightmare. There is none of this in Professor Osborne's book.
Another defect in Professor Hanna's book, which may also result from
factual emphasis, is an inadequate index. For example, there is an excellent note 8 on the difference between a mortgage and a deed of trust, but,
3. 52 Stat. 869, x U. S. C. A. §96 (194o).
4. Preface, p. vi.

5 IbMd.
6. In line with Professor Osborne's comments on esoteric terminology, one wonders is a "person" ever security (since abolition of imprisonment for debt), or, if legal
phrases such as Suretyship and Guaranty must be avoided, isn't it a third person's
obligation or promise that is the security?

7. Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. R., 52 F. (2d) 418
(C. C. A. 8th, 1931).

8. Pp. 612-614.
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unfortunately, there is no reference to it in the index and consequently it
is lost for reference purposes. If one seeks to find customary legal problems by their usual names, the index will be of little assistance. For example, the problem of the merger of the mortgagor's and mortgagee's interest
is not mentioned in the index. However, factual situations are set forth
in full and if the reader is interested in the question of "lending long customer's stock to cover short sales" it will be found properly indexed under
"broker and customer".
Both books are valuable contributions to the field of security law.
Although case books are commonly regarded as material for students, these
books transcend that function and may serve the purpose of a modern
text in the field. The reviewer has had occasion to use both of them to find
answers to practical legal questions and has discovered that they constitute
a mine of information that should not be relegated to the classroom, but
may well be brought into the office.
Albert B. Gerber.t
JURISTIC THEORY.
By Roscoe Pound. Ward Ritchie
Press, Claremont Colleges, i94o. Pp. viii, 83. Price: $1.50.
Despite the author's denial of his assumption of "the role of a prophet
of evil" to warn us of "an impending danger", the three lectures here collected are in substance essentially an admonition against a current trend
toward judicial absolutism.
The first lecture treats of the "Revival of Absolutism". It begins by
reminding us of the way in which the fundamentals of political absolutism
find their way into juristic theory and result in a redefinition of law "to
include what jurists in the past would have called unlaw." The warning
finger of the author is then pointed at administrative agencies which are
viewed with alarm as a threat to the traditions upon which the English and
American judicial systems have been built. Through them, efficiency is
being gained at the sacrifice of liberty. No one will disagree with the
author's conclusion that a proper approach would seek a balance between
the two.
Under the catch-title of "The Give-It-Up Philosophies", the second
lecture develops into a vigorous denunciation of today's legal "realist" who
believes that social control can best be exerted by administering justice
without law, which to the "realist" is but a "dry, analytical system of
formulas". Such philosophy, to the author, is not a new idea; emphatically
we are reminded that its adoption in the past has always led only to
absolutism.
In the same vein, an attack is launched in the third and final chapter
upon the failure of contemporary legal philosophy, which has in the past
provided a guide for, or at least a critique of, legal development, either to
lead or to organize. Despite this failure, it is pointed out that-in practice
the law has -always attempted to adjust relations and to order conduct so
as to eliminate or minimize friction and waste. This measure of values is
still practicable. Defects in our judicial system, therefore, should be remedied not by a reversion to justice without law, but by adapting our law to
the needs of the present-day society in which justice is to be administered.
These lectures were delivered before college audiences. They are primarily philosophical dissertations rather than legal studies. The legal
scholar, therefore, should find much in them that is both absorbing and
inspiring. To my knowledge, however, most lawyers are too absorbed
CONTEMPORARY

f Assistant Counsel, Rural Electrification Administration, United States Depart-

t of Agriculture.
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with practical problems to concern themselves with the trends in legal
theory which appear to be so vital to the author. Perhaps this is unfortunate; nevertheless, it is so and the legal practitioner will doubtless find
little of interest to him in this book unless he be a student of philosophy
as well.
Thomas P. Glassmoycr.t
THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS AUTHORITY. (Monograph No. 19.)
By The
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Department of Justice, Washington, 1940. (2 volumes). Pp. 91, 92-172;
App. 12.
This study in two mimeographed volumes is one of the series of
studies of the administrative procedure of federal agencies undertaken by
the Investigating Staff of the Department of Justice for the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure. The study attempts to
summarize the experience under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 relative to administrative procedure under that Act and to comment upon such
experience in determining whether the procedure now followed should be
changed.
Volume I of the study, after giving an outline of the history of the
regulation of civil aeronautics up to the Act of 1938 and a brief word
about the organization of the Civil Aeronautics Authority, is then devoted
to experience under the economic regulation provisions of the Act. By
economic regulation is meant the issuing of certificates of public convenience and necessity, rate making, air mail rates, control of interlocking
relationships, and other related matters of an economic character. The
procedure followed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority (now Civil Aeronautics Board) is outlined from the filing of an application to the final
action to be taken under the Act.
Volume II considers the experience in administering the safety provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 by the Authority and the now
abolished Air Safety Board. The-chief safety regulation is the issuance
of certificates to pilots, mechanics, parachute riggers, airport control tower
operators and airline dispatchers, and the issuance of type, production and
air, orthiness aircraft certificates. The procedure for the revocation or
suspension of certificates, investigation of accidents, and the imposition of
civil penalties for violations of the Act or rules and regulations promulgated thereunder is considered in detail.
The investigation of accidents by the now abolished Air Safety Board
and the procedure followed in securing information by that Board is described.
Appendix A is an outline of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. Appendix B is a consideration of the organization of the Civil Aeronautics
Authority by Plans III and IV adopted under the Reorganization Act
of 1939.1
This study of the Civil Aeronautics Authority is a compilation of
factual data with intermittent comments, usually praising the work that
has been done. Constructive criticism is rarely given. There are instances
which lead one to conclude that there is no appreciation of the past history
of civil aeronautics legislation and experience. For example, in commenting on air mail rate proceedings, it is said:
"The cardinal impression one derives from the airmail rate proceedings is that formal hearings are extraordinarily ill-adapted to
t Member of the Bar, Philadelphia.
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them. 'Rate proceedings' is a misnomer in this field. 'Subsidy program' would in many instances, at least, be a more apt designation.
Testimony, cross-examination, one may almost say 'evidence', have
little utility in this realm."
With reference to abolition of formal hearings, it is sufficient merely
to point out that the "process of negotiation and consultation" advocated
by the Report led to the so-called air mail scandal of 1934. The reasons
for the transfer of airmail rate proceedings to the Interstate Commerce
Comznmission and then to the Civil Aeronautics Authority from the Postoffice Department and the requirement of a formal hearing were to avoid
political considerations which had predominated in this field when the
"process of negotiation and consultation" was being employed. The reference to "subsidy program" is erroneous insofar as domestic air transportation is concerned since the Postoffice Department now receives more
income from the sale of airmail stamps than such transportation costs the
Department.
This study will, however, prove a valuable addition to the law library
of lawyers interested in aviation.
Charles S. Rhyne.t
BOOK NOTE
By Alpheus Thomas Mason. The Viking Press, Inc., New York, 1941. Pp. 224. Price: $2.50.
Mr. Ickes, the incumbent Secretary of the Interior, in an article entitled
Not Guilty in the Saturday Evening Post I attempted to whitewash Mr.
Ballinger, a former holder of that office, who was involved in one of the
most notorious land frauds in our history. The famous Ballinger case, thus
reopened, is now reexamined by Mr. Mason.
The job is well done, and the records of the case thoroughly analyzed.
Mr.Ickes' effort is shown to be not much more than a superficial treatment
of the subject. No doubt is left in the reader's mind that Ballinger was
guilty of the charges made against him.
In a trenchant style the author catches the electric atmosphere of those
times; the principals in that case live again-Ballinger, Levis, Pinchot,
Taft and, of particular importance to lawyers, Brandeis. The verbal duels
triumphantly carried on by Brandeis with those attempting to whitewash
Ballinger in the Senatorial investigation are recreated with force.
The book, as its title indicates, has a theme-a lesson to be gained; in
the author's own words, "In this unabating surge of bureaucratic aggrandizement, our essential and continuing task is to devise procedures and
techniques contributing to economy and efficiency which at the same time
add new and more effective safeguards for individual liberty." 2 Those who
have read Mr. Mason's The Brandeis WVay 3 will remember that Brandeis
also feared the t5ower of an evergrowing bureaucracy. The present exposition of the Ballinger case clearly reveals the danger there lying. Although
no solution is offered, the author admitting that the scope is limited to an
analysis only, this shortcoming, if it be such, is not enough to detract from
the value of the book.
J.P.J.B.
BUREAUCRACY CONVICTS ITSELF.
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